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Abstract In a stochastic economy of overlapping generations subject to uninsurable
risks, debt can implement Pareto improvements in welfare. This is the case even in
the presence of long-lived assets and no short sales.
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JEL Classification D52 · D61
1 Introduction
Sovereign debt has given rise to two branches of research; more or less independent,
and cross-effects remain to be considered. One was initiated by Bulow and Rogoff
(1989), who focused on incentives for default; here we take our cue from Diamond
(1965), who argued that debt can restore optimality when, as in economies of over-
lapping generations, the market fails to guarantee it. Alternatively, long-lived assets
suffice to restore optimality under certainty or compete markets in elementary secu-
rities, and debt becomes unnecessary, if not unsustainable, because of transversality.
And Demange (2002) argued that this is also the case even with uninsurable risks in an
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incomplete asset market. Evidently, then, it is constrained optimality that is at stake.
Our argument is that constrained optimality applies only in the case of two-period
life spans and one, aggregate, commodity at each date: in economies with a richer
commodity or demographic structure constrained optimality may fail and debt can
implement Pareto improvements in welfare.
More precisely, long-lived assets, land or “Lucas-trees”, restore optimality in
economies that extend over an infinite time-horizon. Wilson (1981) developed the
argument for economies under certainty, and Santos and Woodford (1997) extended
the argument to economies under uncertainty as long as the asset market is complete.
The possible failure of optimality has been studied extensively and is well under-
stood. It derives from the failure of aggregate valuation or, equivalently, an aggregate
budget constraint that obtains when the real rate of interest falls short of the rate of
growth of output. Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) first argued that aggregate
debt or, equivalently, pay-as-you-go social security, may implement optimal alloca-
tions, low interest rates notwithstanding. Cass (1972) gave a condition, weaker than
aggregate valuation, that is necessary and sufficient for a price path to support a Pareto
optimal allocation.
In the presence of uninsurable risks, the optimality properties of competitive allo-
cations are problematic even in finite economies. Not only do competitive allocations
typically fail to be optimal, which is not surprising or even relevant, but, typically,
they fail to be even constrained optimal: competitive markets fail to make optimal
use of the restricted reallocations of risks that fundamentals allow. Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1986) showed that, typically, reallocations of the existing assets
implement Pareto improvements; Carvajal and Polemarchakis (2011) extended the
argument to economies with (purely) idiosyncratic risks. Importantly, constrained
suboptimality occurs with multiple commodities or periods of economic activity, and
it derives from the variation in relative prices that competitive markets fail to internal-
ize.
Demange (2002) demonstrated an important and surprising result: in an economy of
overlapping generations with life-spans of two periods and one, aggregate commodity
at each period, long lived assets traded subject to a ban on short sales restore the
constrained optimality of competitive allocations in the presence of uninsurable risks:
there is no intervention that respects both the prevailing restrictions on risk sharing and
the ban on short sales and implements a Pareto improvement. Here, we give a series of
examples that demonstrate the dependance of constrained optimality on the restriction
to life-spans of two periods and a single commodity. With multiple commodities or
multiple periods in the economic life-time of generations, constrained suboptimality
may arise.
Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Angeletos (2002) considered optimal fiscal policy
under uncertainty, while Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003) and Dutta et al. (2000)
characterized optimal financial policies for social security. The constrained subopti-
mality of competitive allocations provides a foundation for intervention. Here, with
debt along with long-lived assets, aggregate debt policy implements Pareto improve-
ments.
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2 Land
The economy is stationary, of overlapping generations with life-spans of three periods.
Each generation consists of a continuum, of mass 1, of initially identical individuals.
There is one perishable commodity at each date. Individuals receive a deterministic
endowment, ey , when young, a stochastic endowment, ems , when middle-aged, and,
again, a deterministic endowment, eo, when old. Personal states, s, occur with proba-
bility πs ; there is no aggregate risk. Land, in aggregate supply 1, produces a constant
dividend, f . The cardinal utility index, u, satisfies standard curvature, smoothness and
boundary assumptions. Consumption is c, and it is numéraire; holdings of land are y
and the price of land is q. Time commences at t = 0; we omit the subscript, t , that
indicates dates, when no ambiguity arises.
The decision problem of an individual is
max U = [u(cy) + E[u(cms )] + E[u(cos )]],
s.t.
cy + qyy = ey,
cms + qyms = ems + ( f + q)yy,
cos = eo + ( f + q)yms ;
first order conditions are
q
f + q u
′
(cy) = E[u ′(cms )],
q
f + q =
u
′
(cos )
u ′(cms )
.
Equilibrium in the asset markets requires that
yy + E[yms ] = 1;
the expectation operator aggregates land holdings of middle-aged individuals. Evi-
dently, middle-aged and old individuals at the initial date, t = 0, with appropriate
utility functions and asset holdings, implement a stationary equilibrium when activity
does not extend to the infinite past.
We shall argue that there are robust situations in which a fiscal authority can
implement a Pareto improvement relative to the stationary competitive equilibrium
allocation; this, without short sales either before or after the intervention: yy, yms > 0.
The policy instrument is an exogenous specification of investment in land by indi-
viduals when young: yy . Subsequently, individuals trade in competitive markets. In
the absence of aggregate risk, and since individuals are identical at the beginning of
their lives, the intervention does not go beyond allocations a market could implement.
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At a stationary competitive equilibrium
q
f + q u
′
(ey − qyy) = E[u ′(ems + ( f + q)yy − qyms )],
q
f + q =
u
′
(eo + ( f + q)yms )
u ′(ems + ( f + q)yy − qyms )
, and
yy + E[yms ] = 1.
To complete the characterisation of a stationary equilibrium we need to specify appro-
priate initial conditions. There exists an initial old generationwith preferences defined,
without loss of generality, by Uo0 (c
o
0) = co0, and aggregate endowment and holdings
of land as the old generation at the stationary equilibrium; and groups, s, of ini-
tial middle-aged generations, of size πs , with life-spans of two periods, preferences
Ums (c
m
s , c
o
s ) = u(cms ) + u(cos ) and aggregate endowments and initial holdings of land
as all future middle-aged generations.
We fix u(c) = log(c) and endowments ems = em + s > 0, where em > 0,
Eπ (s) = 0, and eo = 0; the latter guarantees that the middle-aged cohort never
short-sell land, while parameter values shall be such that, at the stationary equilibrium,
young generations also do not short-sell.
An economy is specified by the parameters ( f, ey, em, . . . , πs, . . . s, . . .), and a
property is robust if it obtains for an open set of economies.
At all periods, a fiscal authority dictates investment in land, y˜ yt , by young individ-
uals; in addition, it redistributes wealth, but, only at t = 0. Redistribution or transfers
at t = 0 are τ . Young generations have no discretion on their consumption or savings.
On the other hand, middle-aged generations do: they allocate consumption-saving
optimally given the land holdings specified by the fiscal authority when young.
We do not restrict attention to stationary interventions, and, as a consequence, we
specify t when necessary. Nevertheless, for a Pareto improvement, it suffices for the
fiscal authority to set {y˜ yt }∞t=0, with y˜ yt > 0, and y˜ yt = y˜ y , for t  1 : the intervention
is stationary after the initial date.
From the first order condition of the middle-aged at t  1,
q˜t
f + q˜t+1 =
ems + ( f + q˜t )y˜ yt−1 − q˜t y˜mt,s
( f + q˜t+1)y˜mt,s
or
y˜mt,s =
ems + ( f + q˜t )y˜ yt−1
2q˜t
.
We substitute y˜mt,s into the market clearing for land, E [˜ymt,s] = 1 − y˜ yt , to solve for
equilibrium prices,
q˜t =
em + f y˜ yt−1
2(1 − y˜ yt ) − y˜ yt−1
.
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Since we focus on stationary interventions after the initial date, asset prices at t = 1
simplify as
q˜1 = e
m + f y˜ y0
2(1 − y˜ y) − y˜ y0
,
and at t  2 as
q˜ = e
m + f y˜ y
2(1 − y˜ y) − y˜ y .
For t = 0, the first order conditions of initial middle-aged rewrite as
q˜0
f + q˜1 =
ems + τm0,s + ( f + q˜0)yy − q˜0 y˜m0,s
( f + q˜1)y˜m0,s
or
y˜m0,s =
ems + τm0,s + ( f + q˜0)yy
2q˜0
;
yy are initial asset holdings and τm0,s are transfers they get from the fiscal authority.
From period zero asset market clearing,
q˜0 =
em + E[τm0,s] + f yy
2(1 − y˜ y0 ) − yy
.
The dynamics of asset prices1 are {˜qt }∞t=0, with q˜t = q˜ , for t  2: asset prices are
stationary after t = 1.
We shall demonstrate that a Pareto improvement obtains for q˜1 > q and q˜ < q.
Moreover, we restrict the analysis to marginal changes of land holdings and date 0
transfers that translate to marginal changes of prices, allocations and utilities. We
outline the construction of a Pareto improving intervention; a complete derivation
is in the Appendix. For simplicity, we use the notation u(c), keeping in mind that
u(c) = log(c).
Generations t  2 are better-off if and only if
dUt
u ′(cy)
= −dq
(
yy
(
1 − q
f + q
)
+
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
> 0; (1)
dq is the marginal change of asset prices at t  2 relative to the competitive equilib-
rium. The term that multiplies dq in (1) is always positive at a stationary equilibrium
1 The assumption of eo = 0 simplifies the dynamics of asset prices. In particular, the asset price at t is
not a function of the asset price at (t + 1) but, instead, is pinned down only by the land holdings of young
individuals. Our results extend to the case where eo > 0.
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that is characterised by no short sales of land. Generations t  2 are better off if and
only if dq < 0 (q˜ < q): asset prices at t  2 should be lower than at the stationary
competitive equilibrium. The fiscal authority can decrease investment in land by young
individuals after the initial date to make dq < 0 and, as a result, make generations
t  2 better off.
For t = 0, and since, then (and only then) the fiscal authority can redistribute
revenue, for a Pareto improvement it suffices that
dco0 + E
[
dUm0,s
u ′(cms )
]
+ dU0
u ′(cy)
> 0
or, equivalently,
dq1
(
q
f + q − E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
+ dq q
f + q E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
> 0. (2)
Expression (2) depends only on the marginal change of asset prices at t = 1, dq1, and
at t = 2, dq; the marginal change of period zero asset price cancels out and transfers
(redistribution of revenue) add up to zero. The terms multiplying dq1 and dq are
positive at the stationary equilibrium. Since we require dq < 0, a necessary condition
for (2) to be satisfied is dq1 > 0 (q˜1 > q): asset prices at t = 1 should be higher than
at the competitive equilibrium. The fiscal authority can increase investment in land by
young individuals at the initial date to satisfy (2) and, with appropriate redistribution,
make everyone at t = 0 better off.
Finally, the generation t = 1 is better-off if and only if
dU1
u ′(cy)
= −dq
(
−yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
+
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
> 0.
(3)
Since we require dq < 0, the generation t = 1 is better-off if and only if the term
inside the big parenthesis in (3) (that multiplies −dq) is positive or, equivalently,
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
> yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
. (4)
To demonstrate that (4) is satisfied and as a consequence generation t = 1 is better
off, it is convenient to combine (2) and (4) as
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(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
> yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
> yy
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
q
f + q +
q
f +q E
[
u
′
(cms )
u′ (cy) y
m
s
]
q
f +q − E
[
u′ (cms )
u′ (cy) y
m
s
]
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
.
A > B is identical to (4), while B >  is equivalent to (2). A >  is a property of
the stationary competitive equilibrium; A,  do not depend on marginal changes of
asset prices, but, rather, on the characteristics of the stationary competitive equilibrium.
There exist interventions at the initial date such that B > , as argued earlier, and,
in addition, B arbitrarily close to . Since A > , there exist interventions such that
A > B and generation t = 1 is better off. This completes the argument.
The intuition behind the constrained suboptimality result can be best understood if
we focus on the behaviour of generations after date 0. The young members of each
generation, taking prices as given, invest toomuch in land (over-save) to insure against
the bad realisation of uncertainty. The fiscal authority, by decreasing investment in land
by young individuals, induces a non trivial change in asset prices. The latter effect
induces a reallocation of wealth among members of each generation that is welfare
improving. Effectively, individuals invest too much in land because prices are not “set
optimally” at the competitive equilibrium.
3 Debt
To focus on debt, we demonstrate the constrained suboptimality of equilibrium in
a two commodity, two period life-span economy of overlapping generations, where
individuals hold public debt and invest in land. Multiple commodities serve the same
purpose as life-spans of multiple periods. Perturbations of public debt affect the rel-
ative price of commodities that, in turn, induces a reallocation of state-contingent
wealth that improves ex-ante welfare. As before, there are no short sales of land at
equilibrium.
Each generation consists of a continuum, ofmass 1, of initially identical individuals.
There are two perishable commodities at each date: 1 and 2. Individuals desire both
commodities when old and only commodity 1when young. Commodity 1 is numéraire
and its price is normalized to 1, whereas the price of commodity 2 is p. Individuals
receive a non-stochastic endowment, ey1 , when young, a stochastic endowment of
commodity 1, eo1,s , and a non-stochastic endowment of commodity 2, e
o
2, when old.
Notation and assumptions about land as before. There is a government that issues debt,
b, pays interest on debt, i , and levies lump-sum taxes, τ . Time commences at t = 0;
we omit the subscript, t , that indicates dates, when no ambiguity arises. Notation and
assumptions about personal states as before; there is no aggregate risk.
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The decision of an individual is
maxU = [cy1 + E[u(co1,s)] + E[u(co2,s)]],
s.t
cy1 + b + qy = ey1 − τ,
co1,s + pco2,s = eo1,s + peo2 + ( f + q)y + (1 + i)b;
consumption of commodities 1 and 2 are c1 and c2 respectively. First order conditions
are
λy = 1, λos = u
′
(co1,s) =
u
′
(co2,s)
p
,
1
1 + i =
q
f + q = E[λ
o
s ];
λy and λos are the Lagrangemultipliers associated with the budget constraints of young
and old individuals respectively.
No arbitrage between land and debt implies
i = f
q
.
There exist groups, s, of initial old generations, of size πs , with preferences
Uos (c
o
1,s, c
o
2,s) = u(co1,s) + u(co2,s) and endowments, holdings of land and debt as
all future old generations.
The government issues debt and levies taxes to finance outstanding debt
bt + τt = (1 + it−1)bt−1.
For stationarity,
τ = ib.
We compute a robust example to demonstrate the constrained suboptimality of
equilibrium; details are presented in the Appendix. An economy is specified by
(u, f, ey1 , e
o
2, . . . , πs, . . . , e
o
1,s, . . .) and fiscal policy by (τ, b).
At all periods, the government perturbs debt2 held by young individuals; in addition,
it redistributeswealth, but, only at t = 0. Subsequently, individuals trade in commodity
and land markets. We restrict the analysis to stationary marginal changes of debt.
2 As a consequence, lump-sum taxes have to be adjusted accordingly in order for the government budget
to be satisfied.
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For t = 0, and since, then (and only then) the fiscal authority can redistribute
revenue, for a Pareto improvement it suffices that
dU0 + E
[
dUos
λos
]
=
(
1
1 + i dq + db +
b
1 + i di
)
+ (E[λos (eo2 − co2,s)])dp > 0.
(5)
Marginal changes of relative prices are
dp = 1 + i
eo2
(
1
1 + i dq + db +
b
1 + i di
)
. (6)
To simplify the exposition, define as z the following expression
z = 1
1 + i dq + db +
b
1 + i di. (7)
The government can always perturb debt appropriately to determine the sign of z. To
see this, rewrite (7) as
z =
(
1
1 + i
∂q
∂b
+ 1 + b
1 + i
∂i
∂b
)
db,
and, given the sign of the term in parenthesis, marginal changes of debt determine the
sign of z.
Substituting (6) and (7) into (5), it follows
dU0 + E
[
dUos
λos
]
=
(
1 + (E[λos (eo2 − co2,s)])
1 + i
eo2
)
z > 0.
The term that multiplies z is positive; a restriction (inequality) that is satisfied at the
stationary competitive equilibrium. Marginal changes of debt that induce z > 0 imply
that the sum of perturbed utilities is positive.
Generations t  1 are better off if and only if
dUt =
(
−i + (E[λos (eo2 − co2,s)])
1 + i
eo2
)
z > 0.
The term that multiplies z is positive; the second restriction (inequality) that is satisfied
at the stationary competitive equilibrium. Since we require z > 0, marginal changes
of debt induce a Pareto improvement.
Remark 1 It is the pecuniary externality induced by dp = 0 and trade in the second
commodity, eo2 = co2,s , that drives the constrained suboptimality result. If dp = 0 or
eo2 = co2,s , then the stationary competitive equilibrium is constrained optimal.
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4 Capital
Finally, we introduce capital and demonstrate that improving interventions are char-
acterised by higher levels of capital investment relative to the competitive level; the
competitive allocation is characterised by under-investment.
The economy is stationary, of overlapping generations with life-spans of two
periods. Each generation consists of a continuum, of mass 1, of initially identical
individuals. There are two commodities at each date: consumption and labor. Young
and old members of each generation are endowed with l units of time that they supply
inelastically to the market. Shocks affect the individual efficiency of capital invest-
ment. Notation and assumptions about land as before. There is a firm that rents capital,
hires labor and produces output using a Cobb–Douglas technology: F(k, l) = kal1−a ;
k is capital and l labor employed. Profit maximisation requires
1 + r = aka−1l1−a,
w = (1 − a)kal−a;
(1+r) is the real interest rate (factor), and w the real wage. Notation and assumptions
about personal states as before; there is no aggregate risk.
The decision of an individual is
maxU = [cy + E[u(cos )]],
s.t
cy + k + qy = wl,
cos = (1 + r)sk + wl + ( f + q)y;
c is for consumption and s are shocks to individual capital efficiency; shocks are
positive and satisfy the normalisation E[s] = 1. First order conditions are
1
1 + r = E[su
′
(cos )],
q
f + q = E[u
′
(cos )].
There is an initial old generation with preferences Uo0 (c
o
0) = co0 and
co0 = F(k−1, l) − wl + wl + f + q,
where k−1 is the initial capital stock and F(k−1, l) − wl are profits of the firm net of
capital cost at date 0. Initial old are endowed with one unit of land and l units of time.
We demonstrate the constrained suboptimality of equilibrium with a robust exam-
ple; as before, details are presented in the Appendix. An economy is specified by
(u, f, a, l, . . . , πs, . . . , s, . . .). At all periods, a fiscal authority dictates investment
in capital, k, by young individuals; in addition, it redistributes wealth, but, only at
t = 0. Subsequently, individuals trade in commodity and land markets. We restrict
the analysis to stationary marginal changes of capital.
123
Debt and welfare in economies with land
To proceed it is useful to demonstrate the following result: for linear-concave util-
ities and Cobb–Douglas technology, the price of land depends negatively on capital
investment:
∂q
∂k
< 0.
To see this, consider the first order condition with respect to land and substitute
into it the budget constraint of old individuals, firm’s first order conditions and market
clearing. Differentiating q with respect to k, it follows
∂q
∂k
= 1
f
( f +q)2 − E[u
′′
(cos )]
E
[
u
′′
(cos )
(
s
(
k
∂r
∂k
+ 1 + r
)
+ l ∂w
∂k
)]
;
u
′′
< 0, k(∂r/∂k) + 1 + r > 0, (∂w/∂k) > 0, from strict concavity, Cobb–Douglas
and the first order conditions of the firm, respectively. As a result, (∂q/∂k) < 0.
For t = 0, and since, then (and only then) the fiscal authority can redistribute
revenue, for a Pareto improvement it suffices that
dco0 + dU0 =
(
l
∂w
∂k
[(
q
f + q −
1
1 + r
)
− 1
1 + r
]
+ ∂q
∂k
q
f + q
)
dk > 0.
The term that multiplies dk is positive; a restriction (inequality) that is satisfied at
the stationary competitive equilibrium. A policy of higher investment relative to the
equilibrium allocation, dk > 0, implies that the sum of perturbed utilities is positive.
Generations t  1 are better off if and only if
dUt =
(
l
∂w
∂k
[(
q
f + q −
1
1 + r
)
+ r
1 + r
]
− ∂q
∂k
f
f + q
)
dk > 0. (8)
We demonstrate that the term that multiplies dk in (8) is always positive at equi-
librium. As a result, only a policy that increases capital investment relative to the
competitive level, dk > 0, can induce a Pareto improvement.
According to the previous argument, (∂q/∂k) < 0 and (∂w/∂k) > 0. Moreover,
(1+r−( f +q)/q) > 0 is the risk premiumbetween the risky investment in capital and
the safe investment in land which is positive at equilibrium. A positive risk premium
implies r > 0. As a result, the term inside the parenthesis in (8) is positive.
Remark 2 It is the pecuniary externality induced by perturbations of labor income of
old members of each generation that drives the constrained suboptimality result. In
particular, a small increase in k lowers r and increases w, scaling down the part of
income of old individuals that is stochastic and scaling up one part that is determinis-
tic. Also, a small increase in k lowers q, that, in turn, lowers the other part of income
that is deterministic. For the parameter values that we specify to compute an equilib-
rium (see the Appendix), the increase of w dominates and an increase in k induces a
Pareto improvement. Finally, if old individuals do not supply labor, then the stationary
allocation is constrained optimal.
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Remark 3 Carvajal and Polemarchakis (2011) considered a similar economy where
idiosyncratic shocks affect only the productivity of labor of old members of each
generation. They gave an example where the competitive allocation is characterized
by over-investment in capital. Krebs (2003) considered an infinite horizon economy
with heterogenous infinite-lived agents that invest in physical and human capital and
idiosyncratic shocks affect only the return to human capital. He argued that a reduction
in idiosyncratic risk reduces investment in physical, but increases investment in human
capital; the equilibrium is characterised by over-investment in physical capital and
under-investment in human capital. Geanakoplos and Kübler (2015) considered a two-
period economy with heterogenous agents and incomplete markets. They described
mechanisms through which, at equilibrium, agents over-borrow.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
We complete the argument for each of the sections.
Land
We compute a stationary equilibrium for the economy of section “Land”. Fix two
personal states, s ∈ {H, L}, u(c) = log(c), f > 0, eo = 0, ey > 0, ems = em + s >
0, E[s] = 0.
At a stationary equilibrium
q
f + q
1
ey − qyy =
πH
emH + ( f + q)yy − qymH
+ πL
emL + ( f + q)yy − qymL
, (9)
q
f + q =
ems + ( f + q)yy − qyms
( f + q)yms
, and (10)
yy + πH ymH + πL ymL = 1. (11)
From (10) we solve for middle-aged asset holdings, yms , as
yms =
ems + ( f + q)yy
2q
. (12)
Substituting (12) into (9) to solve for young’s asset holdings, we obtain
q
f + q
1
ey − qyy =
πH
emH + ( f + q)yy − q e
m
H+( f +q)yy
2q
+ πL
emL + ( f + q)yy − q e
m
L +( f +q)yy
2q
. (13)
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(13) simplifies as
3q( f + q)(yy)2 + yy(q(emH + emL + 2	) − 2ey( f + q))
+ q
f + q e
m
He
m
L − 2ey	 = 0, (14)
where 	 = πHemL + πLemH . From (14), we get
yy = −(q(e
m
H + emL + 2	) − 2ey( f + q))
6q( f + q)
±
√
(q(emH + emL + 2	) − 2ey( f + q))2 − 12q( f + q)( qd+q emHemL − 2ey	)
6q( f + q) .
(15)
For restrictions onparameters thatwe specify shortly, the small root of (15) is consistent
with negative asset prices and, as a result, we do not consider it. Substitute the big root
of (15) into (12) to solve for yms as a function of q. Substituting y
m
s together with the
big root of (15) into (11) to solve for q, we obtain
−(q(emH + emL + 2	) − 2ey( f + q))
6q( f + q)
+
√
(q(emH + emL + 2	) − 2ey( f + q))2 − 12q( f + q)( qf +q emHemL − 2ey	)
6q( f + q)
+e
m − 2q
f + 3q = 0. (16)
Equilibrium asset prices are computed from (16). Define the left hand side of (16) as

(ξ, q), where ξ = ( f, ey, em, πH , πL , H , L) and πH H +πLL = 0. Equilibrium
requires 
(ξ, q) = 0.
Fix the following economy
ξ∗ = (1.6, 1.05, 4, 0.2, 0.8, 3.2,−0.8).
Substituting into (16), and solving numerically, we obtain3:
q = 2.04859.
Asset holdings of agents are
yy = 0.0125451, ymH = 1.76848, ymL = 0.792198;
individuals do not short-sell land.
3 Expression (16) implies two extra roots: q = −9.19947 and q = −0.240055. Negative asset prices are
not candidates for equilibrium.
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A stationary equilibrium exists for economies in a neighbourhood of ξ∗. The argu-
ment is as follows. 
(ξ, q) = 0 defines q as a function of ξ . The derivative of 
 with
respect to q is nonzero, (∂
/∂q)(ξ∗, 2.04859) = −2.54416 = 0, and the derivative
of 
 with respect to each element of ξ is well-defined. Thus, (∂q/∂ξ)(ξ∗, 2.04859)
is well-defined.
In the next section we demonstrate the constrained suboptimality of the stationary
competitive equilibriumof the ξ∗ economyand of the respective stationary competitive
equilibrium of an economy in a neighbourhood of ξ∗.
Improving interventions
Afiscal authority dictates investment in land, y˜ yt , by young individuals and redistributes
wealth only at t = 0. Redistribution is {τm0,s, τ y0 , τ o0 }, for initial middle-aged, initial
young and initial old, respectively. For a Pareto-improvement, it suffices to restrict
the actions of the fiscal authority to stationary interventions after the initial date:
y˜ yt = y˜ y > 0, t  1.
As argued earlier, from the first order conditions of middle-aged, we compute the
equilibrium prices given the alternative allocation of land and redistribution at date 0.
Taking into account the restriction to stationary interventions at t  1, equilibrium
prices at t = 0 and t = 1, respectively, are
q˜0 =
em + f yy + E[τm0,s]
2(1 − y˜ y0 ) − yy
, and q˜1 = e
m + f y˜ y0
2(1 − y˜ y) − y˜ y0
,
and at t  2,
q˜ = e
m + f y˜ y
2(1 − y˜ y) − y˜ y .
We compute the marginal change of asset prices, relative to the stationary competi-
tive equilibrium, following a marginal change of policy parameters. Marginal changes
in land holdings of the young at t = 0 are denoted by dyy0 , at t  1 by dyy , and
marginal changes of transfers at t = 0 by dτ . Marginal changes of asset prices at
t = 0, t = 1 and t  2, respectively, are
dq0 = 2(e
m + f yy)
(2(1 − yy) − yy)2 dy
y
0 +
1
2(1 − yy) − yy E[dτ
m
0,s],
dq1 = e
m + 2 f (1 − yy)
(2(1 − yy) − yy)2 dy
y
0 +
2(em + f yy)
(2(1 − yy) − yy)2 dy
y, and
dq = 3e
m + 2 f
(2(1 − yy) − yy)2 dy
y . (17)
The derivatives of asset prices with respect to policy parameters (land holdings of
young and redistribution), evaluated at the competitive allocation of the ξ∗ economy
or at the competitive allocation of an economy in a neighbourhood of ξ∗, are positive.
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We compute the marginal changes of utilities relative to the stationary competitive
equilibrium, taking into account the restriction to stationary interventions after the
initial period. For simplicity, we use the notation u(c), keeping in mind u(c) = log(c).
The marginal change of utility of a typical generation t  2 is
dUt
u ′(cy)
= −qdyy − yydq + E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
(( f + q)dyy + yydq − qdyms − yms dq)
]
+ E
[
u
′
(cos )
u ′(cy)
(( f + q)dyms + yms dq)
]
. (18)
Taking into account the first order conditions for an optimum at the stationary com-
petitive equilibrium, (18) simplifies as
dUt
u ′(cy)
= −dq
(
yy
(
1 − q
f + q
)
+
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
.
Following a similar argument for t = 1,
dU1
u ′(cy)
= −dq
(
−yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
+
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
.
Finally, for t = 0,
dU0
u ′(cy)
= dτ y0 + yy
(
q
f + q dq1 − dq0
)
−
(
dq1 − q
f + q dq
)
(
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
,
dUm0,s
u ′(cms )
= dτm0,s + yydq0 − yms dq0 +
q
f + q y
m
s dq1,
dco0 = (1 − yy)dq0 + dτ o0 ,
where (1 − yy) are the initial asset holdings of the initial old.
Generations t  2 are better-off if and only if
dUt
u ′(cy)
= −dq
(
yy
(
1 − q
f + q
)
+
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
> 0.
The term that multiplies −dq is positive at any well-defined stationary competitive
equilibrium that is characterised by no short sales. Generations t  2 are better-off if
and only if dq < 0. According to (17), to achieve that target, the fiscal authority must
dictate lower investment in land by young individuals after the initial date: dyy < 0.
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For t = 0, and aswe demonstrate at the end of this section, for a Pareto improvement
it suffices that
dco0 + E
[
dUm0,s
u ′(cms )
]
+ dU0
u ′(cy)
> 0
or, equivalently,
dq1
(
q
f + q − E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
+ dq q
f + q E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
> 0. (19)
Marginal changes of asset price at t = 0 cancel out by taking the sum of perturbed
utilities across individuals. Also, transfers (redistribution of revenue) add up to zero:
dτ o0 + dτ y0 + E[dτm0,s] = 0. The term multiplying dq1 is positive at the stationary
equilibrium of the ξ∗ economy:
q
f + q − E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
> 0. (20)
Since (20) is an inequality, it is satisfied at the corresponding stationary equilibrium
of an economy in a neighbourhood of ξ∗. Moreover, the term multiplying dq in (19)
is always positive at a stationary equilibrium that is characterised by no short sales.
Since we require dq < 0, a necessary condition for (19) to be satisfied is dq1 > 0. The
next step is to demonstrate that there exists interventions such that (19) is satisfied. To
that end, it can be equivalently written as
dyy0 > −dyy
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
2(em + f yy)
em + 2 f (1 − yy) +
3em + 2 f
em + 2 f (1 − yy)
q
f +q E
[
u
′
(cms )
u′ (cy) y
m
s
]
q
f +q − E
[
u′ (cms )
u′ (cy) y
m
s
]
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
.
(21)
To derive (21), we have substituted for dq1 and dq as a function of dy
y
0 and dy
y from
(17). The right hand side of (21) is positive since we require dyy < 0 and, also, the
term inside the parenthesis is positive at a stationary equilibrium that is characterised
by no short sales and satisfies (20). The fiscal authority can perturb investment in land
by young individuals at t = 0 to satisfy (21) and make the sum of perturbed utilities
positive. Finally, if (21) is satisfied, then dq1 > 0.
The generation t = 1 is better-off if and only if
dU1
u ′(cy)
= −dq
(
−yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
+
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
> 0.
123
Debt and welfare in economies with land
Since we require dq < 0, generation t = 1 is better-off if and only if
(
1 − q
f + q
)
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
> yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
. (22)
To demonstrate that (22) is satisfied, it is convenient to combine (19), the sum of
perturbed utilities at t = 0, and (22) as
(1 − q
f + q )E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A
> yy
(
q
f + q −
dq1
dq
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B
> yy
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
q
f + q +
q
f +q E
[
u
′
(cms )
u′ (cy) y
m
s
]
q
f +q − E
[
u′ (cms )
u′ (cy) y
m
s
]
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
.
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
A > B is identical to (22), while B >  is equivalent to (19). A >  at the stationary
competitive equilibrium of the ξ∗ economy. In particular, A −  = 0.154927. Since
it is an inequality, it is satisfied at the corresponding stationary equilibrium of an
economy in a neighbourhood of ξ∗. The fiscal authority has the discretion to make
B > , as argued before, but also can dictate investment in land such that B can be
arbitrarily close to : choose dyy0 such that the distance between the left and the right
hand side of (21) can be made arbitrarily small. Since A > , there exist perturbation
such that A > B. As a result, generation t = 1 can be made better off.
To complete the argument we demonstrate that everyone in t = 0 can be made
better off by appropriate redistribution. In particular, we compute transfers such that
dco0 =

3
> 0,
dU0
u ′(cy)
= 
3
> 0,
dUm0,s
u ′(cms )
= 
3
> 0,
where  is
 = dco0 + E
[
dUm0,s
u ′(cms )
]
+ dU0
u ′(cy)
= dq1
(
q
f + q − E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
+ dq q
f + q E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
]
> 0.
Initial middle-aged individuals are better off if
dτm0,s = −yydq0 + yms dq0 −
q
f + q y
m
s dq1 +

3
. (23)
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dq0 is a function of aggregate transfers to middle-aged, that is, E(dτm0,s). Substituting
for dq0 as a function of E(dτm0,s) from (17), taking into account asset market clearing,
multiplying each side of (23) with πs and taking the sum of (23) across middle-aged
groups, we pin down E[dτm0,s] as
E[dτm0,s] =
(1 − 2yy) 2(em+ f yy)
(2(1−yy)−yy)2 dy
y
0 − qf +q (1 − yy)dq1 + 3
1−yy
2(1−yy)−yy
. (24)
Substituting (24) into (23), we pin down transfers to each group of initial middle-aged.
Initial old are better off if
dτ o0 = −dq0(1 − yy) +

3
.
Initial young are better off if
dτ y0 = −yy
(
q
f + q dq1 − dq0
)
+
(
dq1 − q
f + q dq
)
(
E
[
u
′
(cms )
u ′(cy)
yms
])
+ 
3
.
Finally, transfers add up to zero
dτ o0 + dτ y0 + E[dτm0,s] =  −  = 0.
Debt
Fix u(c) = log(c), two personal states, s ∈ {H, L}, eo1,s = eo1 + s > 0, E[s] = 0,
s = 0, f > 0 and eo2 > 0.
Combining the first order conditions of consumption and the budget constraints of
old individuals, we pin down their consumption demands
co1,s =
eo1,s + peo2 + ( f + q)y + (1 + i)b
2
,
co2,s =
eo1,s + peo2 + ( f + q)y + (1 + i)b
2p
.
Combining commodity 2 market clearing, E[co2,s] = eo2, and land market clearing,
y = 1, we obtain
p = 1
eo2
(
eo1 + f + q + (1 + i)b
)
. (25)
Substituting for λos as a function of c
o
1,s and then into the first order condition of
debt, we obtain
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1
1 + i = E
⎡
⎣
1
eo1,s+peo2+( f +q)y+(1+i)b
2
⎤
⎦ . (26)
Substituting (25), the no arbitrage between debt and land, i = f/q, and land market
clearing into (26), we obtain
1
1 + i = E
⎡
⎣
1
1
2
(
eo1,s + eo1 + 2 f
(
1 + 1i
) + 2(1 + i)b
)
⎤
⎦ ; (27)
the equilibrium interest rate is a function of b.
To facilitate computations, fix parameters as
f = 0.001, eo1 = 0.3, H = 0.25, L = −0.25, πH = πL = 0.5, eo2 > 0. (28)
eo2 cancels out and does not affect the equilibrium interest rate and allocation; this is
an artefact of log-utilities. Well-defined stationary equilibria, that is, 0 < i < ∞, that
can be improved upon by perturbations of public debt, obtained for b ∈ (0, 0.65);
at b ∈ (0, 0.65), stationary equilibria satisfy all required inequalities for a Pareto
improvement that were mentioned in the section “Debt”. Perturbations of commodity
prices, interest rates and landprices follow from(25), (27) and theno-arbitragebetween
land and debt, respectively. Using (27) and the no-arbitrage between land and debt,
we can verify that perturbations of public debt have a non-trivial effect on commodity
prices. Finally, following a similar argument as in the previous section, stationary
equilibria exist for parameters in a neighbourhood of (28). Since the conditions for a
Pareto improvement take the form of inequalities, the constrained suboptimality of the
stationary allocation or, equivalently, the existence of Pareto improving debt policies
is robust.
Perturbation of utilities are derived using a similar methodology as in the section
“Land” of the Appendix; we do not repeat the calculations. Finally, individuals at
date 0 can be made better off by appropriate redistribution. The methodology is again
similar to the previous section and will not be repeated.
Capital
Wedemonstrate the constrained suboptimality of the stationary equilibrium allocation.
Substituting the budget constraints of individuals, land market clearing, y = 1,
labor market clearing, 2l = l, and the firm’s first order conditions into the first order
conditions of land and capital, we obtain
q
f + q = E
[
u
′ (
sak
a(2l)1−a + (1 − a)ka(2l)−al + f + q
)]
,
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1
aka−1(2l)(1−a)
= E
[
su
′ (
sak
a(2l)1−a + (1 − a)ka(2l)−al + f + q
)]
.
(29)
From (29), we solve for the equilibrium levels of k and q.
Fix the following economy: u(c) = (1/γ )cγ , three equiprobable states, {H, M, L},
H = 2.05, M = 0.9, L = 0.05, a = 0.2, l = 3.6, γ = −4 and f = 0.04. The
equilibrium level of investment is k = 0.03471, the price of land q = 0.01625
and the risk premium 0.218829. The equilibrium satisfies all required inequalities
for a Pareto improvement that were mentioned in the section “Capital”. As before,
stationary equilibria exist in a neighbourhood of the previous parameters values. Since
the conditions for a Pareto improvement take the form of inequalities, the constrained
suboptimality of the stationary allocation is robust.
Finally, perturbation of utilities are derived using a similar argument as in the section
“Land” of the Appendix and will not be repeated. The same applies for redistribution
policies at date 0.
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